A weak double-dividend is the proposition that the welfare improvement from a green tax reform, where the revenue from an environmental tax is used to reduce other tax rates, must be greater than the welfare improvement from a reform where the environmental taxes are returned in a lump sum fashion. We show in this note that a weak double-dividend need not hold in a world with multiple distortions. In an economy with multiple distortions one must choose carefully which tax rates to reduce, or one can do worse than a lump sum redistribution of the environmental tax revenues.
I.

Introduction
Environmental economists have focused a great deal of attention in recent years on the uses of revenues from environmental taxes. The potential for tax policies that reduce pollution while raising revenues that might replace other distortionary taxes holds great appeal for economists and policymakers alike. The potential for this dual role for environmental taxes has been incorporated in the idea of an environmental "double dividend." This is the idea that imposing an environmental tax can both improve economic performance and the environment. Goulder (1995) provides a useful taxonomy of double dividends as well as an explanation of the dividend's appeal. 1 Economists have debated the existence of various forms of double dividends over the past decade. We refer readers interested in the history of this debate to Bovenberg (1999) and his excellent summary of the literature. Here we focus on what has been a relatively uncontroversial idea: the "weak" double dividend. A weak double dividend occurs when the welfare gain achieved by using the environmental tax proceeds to lower some tax rate is greater than the gain achieved by distributing the environmental tax proceeds in a lump sum fashion. In this note we show that in an economy with multiple taxes, one must be careful how to construct a revenue neutral green tax reform.
2 While a reform can be constructed that satisfies the properties of the weak double dividend, it is quite possible to construct revenue neutral green tax reforms that are pareto inferior to a green tax reform that returns the revenue in a lump-sum fashion.
Our argument is a standard second-best argument. In general equilibrium, various existing taxes can affect the "distortion" between the marginal social benefit and cost of a commodity. Then the use of new environmental tax revenues to lower one existing tax and hence reduce a distortion on one margin (between leisure and consumption, for example) may exacerbate a distortion on another margin (intercommodity distortions, for example). This suggests that a careful assessment of just which tax wedge differentials to reduce is necessary or one can do worse than lump sum recycling. This paper can be viewed as complementary to Babiker, Metcalf and Reilly (2003) . That paper uses a large-scale computational general equilibrium model to show that various climate policy options that have been discussed could be dominated by a lump-sum return of revenues from the sale of carbon trading permits. This paper employs a simple general equilibrium model to highlight the underlying efficiency effects in a particularly transparent way.
II.
Model
In this section, we present a simple analytic general equilibrium model to show that the weak double-dividend need not hold. While the weak double-dividend will hold true in a world with only one (non-environmental) distorting tax, it will not necessarily be true in a more general economy.
Our model is particularly simple. There are two goods (X and Y), both of which are produced with labor (L). Good Y creates pollution (Z) as a by-product of the production process. As noted elsewhere (see Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) ), we can model pollution as an input into the production process. Without loss of generality, we can also associate some labor with pollution. This simply assures an interior solution to the model:
where F is a constant returns to scale production function. We assume that one unit of labor is associated with each unit of pollution (L Z = Z) so that the resource constraint is
Utility of a representative agent is a function of consumption of the two goods, leisure (V) and environmental quality (E): (4) U(X,Y,V;E) where E=e(Z), e' < 0.
Consumers maximize utility subject to the budget constraint
where p X and p Y are the consumer prices for X and Y, the gross wage rate equals 1 (labor is taken as the numeraire good) and T is a lump-sum transfer. Leisure and labor sum to a fixed time endowment. Consumer prices are related to producer prices as follows:
where t x and t z are commodity taxes levied on goods X and Y, respectively, to raise revenue, and t z is an environmental tax, levied on Z.
3 Given the technology, the producer prices of X and Z always equal 1 and we normalize the producer price of Y (q Y ) so that it equals 1 prior to the imposition of an environmental tax. The environmental tax is equal to zero initially. Consumer behavior can be represented by the following two equations under the assumption that L and E are weakly separable from each other and from (X,Y) and that utility over (X, Y) is homothetic 4 :
where C is the elasticity of substitution between X and Y in consumption, is the uncompensated labor supply elasticity and is the share of consumer expenditure on X. A hat over a variable indicates a percentage change. In other words,
(For taxes and transfers below, we will define ( )
.) Equation (7) says that substitution between X and Y depends on relative prices for X and Y and C , while equation (8) relates labor supply to the real net wage. The nominal wage is 1 and the real wage equals the nominal wage divided by a price index based on the consumer prices of X and Y.
The government budget constraint is given by
again noting that t Z initially equals zero. Below, we discuss how taxes and transfers adjust to maintain equation (9) as the environmental tax is levied. Finally, pollution abatement can be captured in the production function for Y by
where Y is the elasticity of substitution between clean labor and pollution in production.
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A tax on labor supply is equivalent to a uniform commodity tax in this model and so is redundant.
We consider three different experiments. In each, we introduce a small environmental tax ( 0 t Z > ) and let one of the three following variables adjust endogenously:
. We can then compare the change in utility across policy changes. In general the change in utility is given by:
where is the private marginal utility of income and µ
i s t h e social marginal damages of pollution. 5 The left hand side of equation (11) gives the change in utility in dollar terms dU as a percentage of the value of resources used in production (L). In other words, it expresses the dollar value of the utility change as a percentage of GNP. Differentiating equation (5), we can obtain:
Next, we can differentiate the three price expressions in equation (6) to obtain
Equation (11) is derived by totally differentiating the utility function, substituting in the consumer's first order conditions from utility maximization along with the total derivative of the resource constraint. Assuming firms set producer price equal to marginal cost,
where * Z L and * Z are the observed levels of labor input and pollution used in the production of Y. These equalities follow since the production function is constant returns to scale. Differentiating this equation, invoking the Envelope Theorem, and using equation (6b), we obtain
Finally, we can differentiate the resource constraint (equation (3)) to obtain
If we substitute equations (14), (15'), and (16) into equations (7), (8), (12), and (13), we can express the general equilibrium response in terms of tax changes rather than price changes:
Equations (18) - (21) As we consider implementing a small tax on pollution ( Z t > 0), we have a number of possible uses of revenues. Table 1 outlines the three policies we consider: A weak double dividend occurs when the welfare gains from policy 2 or 3 is greater than the welfare gains from the first policy 6 . We next show that the weak double dividend need not hold.
III. Results
We impose a small environmental tax (starting at a zero tax rate) and solve the general equilibrium model described above and use equation (11) to measure the welfare impact of the policy. We note our parameter assumptions in Table 2 . These parameter assumptions are based on Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) . Allocation  40 30 30 30   Table 3 reports the welfare gain (or loss) for a small environmental tax with proceeds returned lump sum, for various configurations of initial tax rates. We simulate an environmental tax rate equal to ten percent of the producer price of pollution (
. In general the tax is welfare enhancing unless the commodity tax on the polluting good (t Y ) is disproportionately larger than the tax on the non-polluting good (t X ). This follows since the pollution tax increases the cost of the polluting good and so increases the intercommodity distortion between goods X and Y that exists initially because of the commodity tax. Note that a welfare loss can result from the increased wedge between the prices of X and Y despite first-order gains from reduced pollution. Table 3 . Lump sum return of tax
Welfare impact of a new environmental tax for different initial tax rates on X and Y Table 4 conducts a similar set of simulations in which environmental taxes are used to lower taxes on X. 
Welfare impact of a new environmental tax for different initial tax rates on X and Y Again, the environmental tax raises welfare unless the polluting good is taxed more heavily than the non-polluting good. Note that the welfare change is constant (and equal to the environmental benefit -the last term in equation (11)) so long as the two goods are taxed at the same rate. This follows because of our assumption of weak separability of consumption from leisure along with homotheticity. In such a case, the optimal tax is a uniform tax on commodities (see Deaton (1979) ). Given the optimal construction of the tax system, the change in the tax on pollution has first order welfare effects only through changes in environmental quality.
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Next we compare the welfare gains from returning the environmental tax by lowering the tax on the clean good (X) versus increasing the lump-sum transfer. This table is constructed by subtracting entries in Table 3 from the corresponding entries in Table 4 . A weak double dividend occurs in cases where entries in Table  5 are positive. The first row is the usual case considered in the literature when there is only one distortionary tax on the non-polluting commodity. In this case, the weak double dividend holds. When the initial tax on the polluting good is sufficiently higher than the tax on the non-polluting good, however, a weak double dividend will not hold. In other words, it will be better to return the environmental proceeds lump-sum rather than use them to reduce a tax that is already lower than socially optimal. Table 6 shows that this result is not due to the particular commodity tax chosen to be lowered in response to the environmental levy. Now we use the proceeds to lower the commodity tax on the polluting good. Again, the weak double dividend fails if the environmental tax revenues are used to reduce the commodity tax on the good currently taxed at a lower rate.
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In general if the environmental tax revenue is used to reduce the differential between two distorting taxes then a weak double dividend occurs. If the recycling increases the difference between existing distortions then recycling is welfare worsening compared with lump sum recycling even if it reduces an existing distortion (here between leisure and labor). In other words, in an economy with multiple distortions one must choose carefully which distortions to reduce, or one can do worse than a lump sum redistribution.
IV. Conclusion
We have shown in a simple analytic general equilibrium model that the weak double dividend does not hold unambiguously. Relative tax distortions play an important role in this result. Revenue recycling can be welfare worsening if it increases the intercommodity distortions even if it reduces an existing tax wedge. This suggests that a careful assessment of just which distortions to reduce is necessary or one can do worse than lump sum recycling. While this result is of theoretical interest, it turns out also to be of important practical interest. In Babiker, Metcalf and Reilly (2003) , we use a large-scale computable general equilibrium model to demonstrate that the weak double dividend is unlikely to hold for a number of European countries when policies are considered to reduce carbon emissions. 8 These qualitative results hold over any reasonable range of estimates for parameter values in Table 2 .
